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1
‘Europe, for example’1 
 
The Philosopheme 
The continental philosopher Rodolphe Gasché was once paid the not very friendly 
tribute of expounding philosophical texts ‘with an undertaker’s gravitas’.2 Not very 
friendly perhaps, but wittily apt. Writing on Derrida at a time when deconstruction 
seemed to many to be a species of flamboyant literary criticism, Gasché insisted on 
‘restoring [deconstruction’s] rigorous meaning against its defenders as well as 
against those who argue against it’.3 His mode was a form of precise exegesis and 
scholarship that maintained itself in relentless opposition to what he perceived as the 
lightweight indulgence of literary playfulness. 
His rigour was philosophical, but the jibe against him was that it was of the type 
“mortis”. Something similar might be felt on reading Gasché’s most recent work, a 
long study on the theme of Europe in phenomenological thought.4 Here as before, 
the accent is on an inquiry that is conducted ‘in as precise a manner as possible’, 
tackling this ‘philosophical topos’ through a ‘methodologically sound, scholarly 
investigation’.5 
Gasché wants to champion an approach that would be a model of, as he puts it, 
‘“serious”, that is, philosophical discussion’.6 However, scholarly though it is, sober 
though it is, passionless or disinterested it is not. Gasché’s “seriousness” takes its 
                                                        
1 Luisa Passerini, Memory and Utopia: The Primacy of Intersubjectivity (London: Equinox, 2007), p. 107. 
Naturally, I could have cited this title from a thousand sources, and this one may even be more problematic 
than most since Passerini may herself be citing this from another source, since (although there are no 
quotation marks in the English text) the sentence finishes with a citational reference. I cite this little formula 
in turn from Louisa Passerini’s text to acknowledge my gratitude to her for her tenacious and passionate 
engagement with the question of Europe’s identity. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Oisin 
Keohane for his subtle and thoughtful responses to my own thinking, both here and elsewhere. 
2 Geoffrey Bennington, ‘Deconstruction and the Philosophers (The Very Idea)’, in Legislations: The Politics of 
Deconstruction (London: Verso, 1994), p. 14. 
3 Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the philosophy of reflection (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1986), p. 182. 
4 Rodolphe Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task: A Study of a Philosophical Concept (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009). 
5 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 4. 
6 Gasché , Tain of the Mirror,  p. 1. 
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bearings from an intensely critical perception of what passes for scholarship and 
theoretical judgement in the vicinity of his chosen ‘topos’. In his early work it was 
certain ‘literary critics’ who felt the full force of his rebuke. As he got underway his 
writing became suddenly and explosively charged with disdain and contempt, the 
gloves came off, and Gasché launched against the ‘feeble’ work of those he regarded 
as both naïve and simplistic.7 
And so it is too with his new ‘study of the evolution of the notion of “Europe” in 
phenomenological thought’.8 What he calls the ‘astute’ reader, ‘the philosophically, 
and especially the phenomenologically, schooled reader’, will understand that such a 
study is irreducibly concerned with philosophy itself, and with some of its most 
central issues: ‘universality, rationality, apodicticity, responsibility and world’.9 
However, these issues, bearing as they do on everything ‘shaped by the demand to 
transcend whatever is particular’ connect equally irreducibly (and with the concept 
of “Europe” as the leading theme), immediately and inescapably with what Gasché 
perceives as the utterly inadequate (especially philosophically inadequate) work on 
Europe that stands in ‘opposition’ to his own inquiry: work that can only conceive 
these “values” (‘universality, apodicticity, responsibility and world’) as ‘Eurocentric’, 
and which always insists that ‘European rationalism’ far from transcending its 
situation ‘is situated, and hence relative…and particular’.10 Here again, the impetus 
for Gasché’s discussions seems to be a sense of the profound failure of a currently 
dominant discourse to do justice to the complexity of issues, in this case concerning 
‘the thought of Europe’.11 The academic reflex of our time on this theme, with its 
historicism and pan-politicism, calls for a counter discourse that is philosophically 
and especially phenomenologically informed. Europe is not to be construed simply 
in terms of ‘the continent and its history’, not simply, then as ‘a geographical and 
political entity’.12 On the contrary, for Gasché it is absolutely crucial that we 
                                                        
7 Gasché , Tain of the Mirror,  p. 1. 
8 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p.5. 
9 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 4. 
10 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 8. 
11 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 9. 
12 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 16. 
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acknowledge, in a rigorous engagement with what we understand by “Europe”, 
‘something else as well’.  
And then, perhaps surprisingly, he also immediately admits ‘one does not exactly 
know what this is’.13 
This “confession” of not-knowing, so untypical of most academic writings, is in fact a 
very classically philosophical, especially phenomenological, gesture. Coming 
reflectively to terms with phenomena that are both (in some way) known and (in 
some other way) ‘not exactly known’ is the form of clarification that 
phenomenologically inspired philosophy takes. The starting sense of unclarity in 
such a case, the not exactly knowing that is at issue here, is one which contrasts 
sharply with the state of pre-theoretical ignorance that comes before making 
discoveries or building theories in science, and for the phenomenological 
philosopher it is precisely this contrast which brings into view the contour of a 
distinctively philosophical question. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
philosophical questions in his Philosophical Investigations presents St Augustine’s 
condition of estranged empuzzlement in the face of the question of time (“What is 
time?”) as paradigmatic.14 With an explicit rather than merely casual focus on time 
Augustine confesses that ‘if no one questions me I have no problem; if I am 
questioned I am at a loss’.15 ‘This could not be said about a question in natural 
science’, Wittgenstein notes.16 Martin Heidegger’s conception of our starting 
unclarity with respect to the question of Being (“What is the meaning of ‘Being’?”) 
has a fundamentally similar shape: it concerns something which is, in one way, 
‘closest and well known’ but, in another way, ‘the farthest and not known at all’17. 
Heidegger’s effort at phenomenological clarification is thus oriented towards 
bringing something that is, as he puts it, in ‘an egregious sense’ ‘hidden’ (note that 
                                                        
13 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 16. 
14  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), §89. It may come as a 
surprise to see Wittgenstein cited among phenomenological philosophers, but he is recorded as saying as 
much himself: ‘You could say of my work that it is “phenomenology”’ (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Recollections of 
Wittgenstein, ed. Rush Rhees, Oxford: OUP, 1984, p. 116). I defend this way of looking at his work in detail in 
the opening chapter of Glendinning, In the Name of Phenomenology (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). 
15 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §89. 
16 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §89. 
17 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), p. 69. 
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what it is to be hidden in this way, this egregious sense of being hidden, is itself 
something hidden in the way that philosophical matters for thinking are hidden) into 
some kind of thematised relief, to “let us see” it in the very way in which it shows 
itself.18 Significantly, the Augustinian reference that Wittgenstein draws on to 
illustrate the sense of something that can be ‘hidden’ both in view of and despite its 
(unthematised) ‘familiarity’19 also belongs to Heidegger’s elaboration of this point, 
although the issue has (on the face of it) shifted. He (Heidegger) cites Augustine’s 
avowal of estrangement from his own being: ‘But what is closer to me than myself? 
Assuredly I labour here and I labour within myself; I have become to myself a land 
of trouble and inordinate sweat’.20 The theme may appear to have changed but the 
experience of empuzzlement in the face of a question is the same.21 
And something similar should hold, Gasché is claiming, with the question of Europe. 
Here too there is some sort of unthematised, pre-reflective understanding, something 
already available that can make it possible to get an investigation underway, but also 
(we need to avow at the outset) a kind of opacity and non-knowing too, a non-knowing 
that calls not for new knowledge – whether this would concern (what we think we 
understand already as) Europe’s accomplishments or its failures, nor even new 
information concerning (what we think we understand already as) Europe’s ‘location, 
culture and history’22 – but an effort to find one’s way about with a concept or idea 
concerning which it is not ‘immediately clear to what content such a concept or idea is 
assigned’.23 “Europe”, in short, is ‘something like a philosopheme’.24 
                                                        
18 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 59. 
19 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §129. 
20 Cited from St Augustine’s Confessions in Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 69.  
21 In one respect the shift of theme is fairly superficial since Heidegger, like Augustine, regards a certain way 
of being in time as characterising the fundamental meaning of a finite existence (see Heidegger, Being and 
Time, p. 38). On the other hand, the condition of empuzzlement that Heidegger is particularly concerned to 
voice relates to the absence of a felt puzzle, in our time, with respect to the question of the meaning of Being. 
Hence while Augustine expresses reflective disorientation with respect to a question which, once raised, is 
immediately experienced as a problem, Heidegger’s disorientation includes a certain bafflement at the 
absence of such immediate bafflement. The phenomenological problem in Heidegger’s case has a relation to 
history not experienced in Augustine’s. I am grateful to Oisin Keohane for highlighting this contrast. The 
case of Europe discussed in this paper will be closer to the case of the question of Being than the question of 
time. 
22 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 16. 
23 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 17. 
24 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 17. 
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Gasché’s wanting to construe the question of Europe as calling for a distinctively 
philosophical and especially phenomenological study could, perhaps, have retained a 
studied indifference to what it understands as its ‘opposition’. And for the most part 
that is exactly what Gasché does. However, as I have indicated, the horizon of his 
inquiries includes that opposition and a desire to confront it. Indeed, at the very 
moment where his text declares the necessity to restate the question of what we already 
mean and understand by “Europe”, he identifies a stubbornly dogmatic discourse that 
stands squarely in the way of such an inquiry: 
Undoubtedly, there are many who confidently pretend to know exactly 
what Europe has stood for, and continues to stand for – namely a 
hegemonic phantasm and moribund worldview. By depicting Europe 
and the West as a homogeneous power of domination over the rest of 
the world, postcolonial criticism of European imperialism, and its 
construction of non-European cultures, knows perfectly what Europe 
is. Indeed it knows it so well that it indulges in the same lack of 
differentiation of which it accuses the West in its relation to its others. 
It thus turns Europe into the blind spot of its own discourse.25  
I don’t suppose that Gasché takes an especially close eye on everything that goes on 
in postcolonial criticism today; no more in any case than he did literary criticism in 
the 1980s. So the charge of presenting as homogenous something rather 
differentiated and complex might be turned against him. However, just as his earlier 
critique of literary criticism hit a nerve, so his rounding on postcolonial criticism 
today seems to me a timely if somewhat hazardous intervention. 
In this paper I hope to show why a philosophically informed approach to the 
question of Europe interrupts at least one doxa that underlies the orthodox thought of 
Europe as the site of a ‘moribund worldview’; namely, the construal of Europe, in an 
undifferentiated kind of way, as dominated by a political culture that is 
fundamentally compromised by a (seriously and straightforwardly) egregious but 
often implicit ‘racial theory’, ‘raciology’, or by an underlying ‘racial metaphysics’. In 
this paper I intend to show why this kind of matter-of-course understanding is 
                                                        
25 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 16. 
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inadequate, and point the way towards a more rounded and judicious conception of 
Europe’s entanglement with racism. 
 
The Metaphysics of Europe 
We would do well not to pretend to know where the politics of racial supremacy 
begins and ends, or what it might mean to be free of it. But we do know that it has 
flourished and indeed still circulates in Europe.  
Gasché’s question, however, is whether we know so well what we mean when we 
say that it has been and is in Europe that it has made its way? Do we mean simply: it 
(racism) at some more or less traceable time became a widespread conviction for 
many human beings inhabiting a certain location in global-territorial space, at a 
certain time coming to dominate the worldview of a particular ‘geographical and 
political entity’?  
In my view, we should not be content with approaches that assign a purely 
geographical and political meaning to Europe. For example, if we are asking about 
the coming into being of Europe, then it seems clear that we are concerned in this case 
not only with the coming-to-be-named of a particular region of the global surface but 
also the becoming-European of a certain world. The idea of the “coming into being of 
Europe” that I am appealing to here, involves the emergence and elaboration of a 
distinctive understanding of the world.26 And the heirs of this understanding have 
their being in this European world, whether they like it or not, and indeed whether 
they know it or not – and, moreover, whether, geographically speaking, they are “in 
Europe” or not. It is the very element of their historical existence, fundamental to the 
localization of their being, fundamental to their being-in-the-world and the meaning 
of their “I am”.  
                                                        
26 An understanding of the world contrasts here with an understanding of the globe; the former includes an 
understanding of the significance of our lives or the meaning of our being, the latter is something one learns 
in geography classes at school. So-called “globalisation” is always better framed as a phenomenon of the 
world-wide-ization of a world. 
Simon Glendinning 
7   
It is for this sort of reason that it was as a figure of a distinctive “spiritual” 
configuration, a configuration of spirit, that phenomenologists have attempted to 
construe “Europe”. And in doing so, as Jacques Derrida notes, they ‘no longer 
assigned [it] a geographical or territorial outline’.27 Gasché’s assault on postcolonial 
criticism aims at a tendency he finds in it consistently – constitutively – to occlude in 
any question of Europe its distinctively philosophematic character. We shall not. 
This European world, ‘in its ruinous blindness forever on the point of cutting its own 
throat’,28 has indeed proved a fertile ground for racist construals of human 
differences, and it launched colonialist and neo-colonialist adventures abroad which 
were forever on the point of cutting the throat of every other too. Certainly. But how 
are we to delimit this European world? And on what terrain does it become 
accessible? If “Europe” is not only the name of a region of the global surface but 
something like, for example, ‘the unity of a spiritual life, action, and creation’29 then 
perhaps the point or place of departure for what we are seeking is less a matter of 
researching opinions on territorial questions (a kind of questioning that rather 
evidently presupposes that ‘spiritual life’ in question) but finding a way of reading 
or making legible the ‘configuration of spirit’ that belongs to Europe. In his 
biography of Flaubert, published in 1971-2, Jean-Paul Sartre points towards the kind 
of analysis one needs here: 
Flaubert writes for a Western world which is Christian. And we are all 
Christians, even today; the most radical disbelief is still Christian 
atheism. In other words it retains, in spite of its destructive power, 
schemata which are controlling – very slightly for our thinking, more 
for our imagination, above all for our sensibility. And the origins of 
these schemata are to be sought in the centuries of Christianity of 
which we are the heirs, whether we like it or not.30 
The horizon of Sartre’s “we” is explicitly occidental. It is also a rather unrefined and 
insufficiently nuanced, imprudent, schematization. Nevertheless, to his credit Sartre 
                                                        
27 Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 120. 
28 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (London: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 37. 
29 Edmund Husserl, cited in Derrida, Of Spirit, p. 120. 
30 Jean-Paul Sartre, 1979. ‘L’idiot de la famille vol. 2, p. 2124 (trans. Robert Denoon Cumming). 
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leaves space for non-Christian ‘schemata’ in this inheritance, especially ‘for our 
thinking’. And although this will also require further, more prudent, analysis, I think 
we should reserve a special place for (at the very least) a distinctively Greek 
conceptual legacy in this world-formation. Along with that Greek legacy, we might 
then appropriate his reference to ‘the centuries of Christianity’ to make a start in 
specifying the decisive ‘schemata’ of a distinctively European world. What is at issue 
here is not simply the history of a specific region of the globe, but the emergence of 
what Heidegger would call the clearing or lighting [Lichtung] of the “there” [Da] of a 
determinate historical Da-sein: the opening and holding in sway of a world marked 
by a distinctive form of understanding, imagination and feeling – the localization of 
the cogito of European subjectivity. 
When asked how a philosopher might construe Europe, Emmanuel Levinas replied 
with the formula ‘Europe is the Bible and the Greeks’.31 To put this in the terms 
Sartre uses, Europe is the phenomenological event, still not over, of the Graeco-
Christian schemata. With these above all (but, of course, not only with these) we are 
homing-in on the basic structural articulations of the world-understanding that is the 
clearing, the “there”, the somewhere where I am of European Da-sein. 
The task, then, is to provide some kind of reading of the schematic traces of this old 
cultivated place. And if we are serious about talking about European metaphysics in 
this context then it surely bears stressing or at the very least acknowledging that the 
metaphysics in which the ethnocentrism and the anti-ethnocentrism, the 
Eurocentrism and the anti-Eurocentrism of our epoch has its place of birth, is not 
racial  and regional but, in its dominant formation, profoundly humanist and 
cosmopolitan in character. That is, it is constituted on the basis of a particular 
conception of the universal humanity of “Man”, in terms of a distinctively human 
distinction, and hence in terms of a philosophical anthropology that would claim to be 
prior to any empirical science of human differences. Filling out (but not rounding out, 
and this remains an issue) the Levinasian formula somewhat, Heidegger, in the 
opening chapter of Being and Time, identifies the ‘sources’ of the event (still not over) 
                                                        
31 Emmanuel Levinas, Is it Righteous to Be?, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) p. 182. 
Simon Glendinning 
9   
that brings “we Europeans” into being, the ground or, better, the archē of the 
understanding of what we are that belongs to ‘we…in our time’ (note the fateful 
equivocation in the “we” there), in terms of ‘an orientation thoroughly coloured by the 
anthropology of the ancient [Greek] world [the conception of Man as the zōon logon 
echon (animal rationale)] and Christianity [the conception of Man as made in God’s 
image]’.32 Following Heidegger, I will refer to this orientating occidental anthropology 
of ‘our time’ as ‘humanism’.33 
  
The History of Spirit 
Heidegger characterizes humanism as that tradition of more than one tradition in 
which what it calls “Man” is defined by setting it off as one kind of entity present in the 
world among other entities. Of course, human beings are not then simply equated with 
mere things in the world or even with other living creatures. On the contrary, “Man” is 
accorded a specific and special difference or dignity: “Man” is the animal endowed 
with the capacity to reason or for language; or “Man” is the ens finitum made in God’s 
image.  
According to Heidegger, philosophy in the modern (post-Cartesian) period has 
inherited the essential features of this classic humanism. That is, modern philosophy 
too conceives human existence primarily in terms of the presence in the world of a 
natural creature which is then accorded a distinctive and distinguishing trait (reason, 
consciousness, language, culture, tool use, etc).  
                                                        
32 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 48. As Stephen Mulhall notes, the Christian anthropology also represents 
“us” as ‘reaching yearningly beyond our creaturely existence’ and this desire for transcendence is retained 
in Heidegger’s ‘idea of Dasein as transcendent’ (Stephen Mulhall, Philosophical Myths of the Fall, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 46-7). If we add that the possession of the “logos” remains in view 
with Heidegger’s conception of the constitution of Dasein’s “there” as characterised primordially by 
‘discourse’ (Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 172) it becomes clear that his ‘fundamental ontology’ does not so 
much ‘detach’ itself from the tradition or reject it as ‘radically rethink’ it (Mulhall, Philosophical Myths of the 
Fall, p. 47). 
33 This is a term Heidegger comes to use more frequently after Being and Time, especially after the writing of 
the ‘Letter on Humanism’ (prepared for publication in 1947) but the idea is not new to the later writings. 
Heidegger’s own position is (by his own admission) an original kind of (and hence rethought) ‘humanism’ 
(Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, Basic Writings, ed., D.F. Krell, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 245); a 
position evident in his saying of classic humanism that it did not set man’s ‘humanitas’ too high but rather 
‘not…high enough’ (Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, pp. 233-4). In this essay, by humanism I mean the 
classical humanism that Heidegger works through but does not endorse. 
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Thus the metaphysical heritage of Europe, the onto-theology which is more than merely 
“from” Europe but which is inseparable from the becoming-European of a world, 
inseparable from the Da-sein that, for every European, is “mine”, is marked precisely by 
the way it rejects every fully naturalistic idea of Man – and hence rejects every biologistic 
(racial) determination of the human and of human differences – and proposes that ‘this 
insufficient definition of Man’s essence [must and can] be overcome or offset’ by adding 
on to it the idea of Man having ‘an immortal soul’; or by ‘adjoining a mind to the 
human body’ and saying that we are a thinking thing, a rational being or a self-
conscious subject or whatever.34  
I am contrasting this classic humanist metaphysics (which is in no way beyond 
question) with a naturalistic metaphysics of the human in order to call into question the 
idea that the European world is to be thought on the basis of the racism that made its 
way there. For if one is a classic humanist it is clearly unthinkable that there could be 
immutable (or, if one is modishly Darwinian about glacial changes in such matters, 
given for all intents and purposes) ‘racial types’ that might be positioned on a linear 
inferior/superior scale. That racist construal will always contrast with the humanist 
view that all morally significant human differences are reducible (since we are all, for 
example, made in the image of God or are all rational - and hence free - creatures). 
As we shall see, classic humanists were not in the least averse to constructing 
hierarchies of development, and no doubt this prepared the way for racial 
naturalizations of the worst kind, but this European humanism entailed an 
ethnocentric history of the world in which no human group was considered ‘beyond 
reform’. The liberation of the humanity of Man in history, the emancipation or de-
alientation of rational subjectivity, is something available to all. This view may be 
deeply and problematically ethnocentric, but it is not a thesis of racial superiority, it 
is not a raciology or racial metaphysics. On the contrary, it explicitly contradicts the 
racist assertion that some human ‘types’ are inherently (or to all intents and purposes 
inherently) inferior to others and always will be (or to all intents and purposes 
always will be). 
                                                        
34 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, pp. 228-9. 
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The classic ‘worldview’ “in” Europe, indeed, the dominant European understanding of 
what we are – and ultimately this is of course an understanding that European 
phenomenology wants radically to rethink and that the Heideggerian ‘analytic of 
Dasein’ is precisely intended, not without its own problems, to accomplish35 – is as a 
creature with special potential and ‘dignity’, a creature with a special destiny, a creature 
with something other than a merely natural history. And even if the dominant 
European construal of this history has been profoundly ethnocentric (European 
humanity as the avant garde in all this humanist teleology) the anthropology is 
genuinely universal in character: the universal “essence” of the human is a “potential”, 
a potential-for-being shared by every human being. And in (as) history, we (all humanity) 
are (on this understanding that is distinctively, particularly, exemplarily European) on 
our way to actualising this potential as fully rational, spiritual beings. ‘Even the 
Papuan’, as Edmund Husserl so problematically puts it.36 
This non-exclusion of the supposedly ‘primitive’ human beings of Papua New Guinea 
shows well quite how double-edged European humanism is. The humanist vision of 
the history of humanity as the movement towards the realisation of an ideally human 
end for all humanity, is a history in which “Man” increasingly becomes (makes 
himself) what he already was potentially: peaceful, rational and free. History is thus 
a movement of transition from a (lowly) origin to a (higher) end: from animality to 
humanity; nature to culture; war to peace; instinct to rationality; superstition to 
science; servitude to freedom. And all humanity can belong to this movement. On the 
other hand, however, participation in this movement of the history of the world is 
not conceived as evenly distributed over the whole of humanity at once or as a 
whole. On the contrary, human beings around the world are identified as being at 
                                                        
35 The argument here is that racism presupposes a biologism or naturalism of human differences. With 
respect to the metaphysics of classic humanism, I think the contrast is clear. However, as I have indicated, 
the metaphysical account of Man – which supposes that naturalism can be overcome by adding a distinctive 
trait to the human animal – is not itself beyond question, and in Heidegger’s thought the difference of Man (qua 
Dasein) is construed in terms of access to Being. In this account our animality is rethought on the basis of our 
humanity; the later is not thought (additively) on the basis of our animality. The worry is, of course, that this 
inversion of the direction of determination opens the possibility of a “thought of race” that is not biologistic. And, 
with Derrida, in Of Spirit, we might ask at this point whether, ‘by thus inverting the direction of determination, 
Heidegger is alleviating or aggravating this “thought of race”?’ Given the traditional opposition to classic 
humanism, the temptation is to think that the thought of race cannot really do without the biologistic recourse. 
Derrida suspicion is that Heidegger’s overcoming of classic humanism opens a new path, or new legitimation, of 
a thought of race even as it closes the ones freed up by classic humanism. 
36 Edmund Husserl, cited in Derrida, Of Spirit, p. 121. 
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different stages of development on a fundamentally linear trajectory. Here, for 
example, is Hegel’s depressingly familiar verdict on human existence in sub-Saharan 
Africa (what he dismally calls ‘Africa proper’): 
Africa proper, as far as History goes back, has remained shut up; it 
is…the land of childhood…enveloped in the dark mantle of Night… The 
Negro exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed 
state… At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again.37 
If it is Africa proper that remains ‘in the condition of mere nature’ and stands only at 
the threshold of History proper, it is Europe that is furthest along the path toward 
the proper “end of Man”.  
So, without doubt, the metaphysics of Europe marks Europe itself out as a special 
place (“spiritually” special, special in the order of spirit). However, even a classically 
Eurocentric thinker like Hegel resists the idea that the peoples of this territory should 
be considered anything more than contingently well-placed to be at history’s head. 
Indeed, Hegel’s claim is that it is largely climatic and geographical differences and 
not human differences at all that are responsible for Europe becoming the main stage 
of ‘the drama of the World’s History’. Geography matters for this History of Spirit 
insofar as it does or does not provide a certain existential comfort for  human 
inhabitants: in either ‘the glaring rays of the sun’ or in ‘the icy frost’ human beings 
never get beyond eking out a survival. So ‘the true theatre of History is’, he argues, 
limited to ‘the temperate zone’ – and, he says, specifically to its ‘northern half’ whose 
continental form displays, as he puts it, ‘a broad breast’.38 
The idea of an historical advantage accruing from such a form may seem far-fetched, 
but Hegel’s basic point is that the great landmass of the Eurasian continent provides 
a space suitable to the formation of deeply and increasingly interconnected social 
                                                        
37 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (London: Bell, 1894), pp. 95-103. Hegel keeps his word 
here. 
38 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 84. This kind of climatology has a long history in European 
metaphysics, going back at least to Aristotle. In the Politics, (Book VII, section 7, 1327b, pp 19-34), for 
example, Aristotle contrasts both cold and icy ‘Europe’ and hot and despotic ‘Asia’, with the environment of 
the Greeks (‘the Hellenic race [‘genos’]) which, in the middle, is of intermediate character. It would appear 
that the weather seems especially good wherever Spirit makes its way. I am indebted to Oisin Keohane for 
the Aristotelian example. 
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lives in a way that stands in contrast to the more fragmented lands of the southern 
half of the temperate zone. Immanuel Kant had said something similar in the context 
of his own elaboration of a ‘universal history’ with a ‘cosmopolitan purpose’: it is the 
close trading links that have developed ‘in our continent’ which prepared the way 
for the world-historical developments which were taking place there.39  
I am not saying that any of this is free of ethnocentric or Eurocentric prejudices.40 Not 
at all. However, it is crucial to see that the metaphysics of Europe is not a raciology, 
not a theory of racial superiority. Rather it unfolds as a humanist anthropology in 
which the particularity of the peoples ‘in our continent’ is understood in terms of a 
world-historical movement of transcendence of every ethnic particularity: the movement 
towards the global realization, the globalization or world-wide-ization, of an ideally 
human form of life. This is, first of all, a philosophy of the human distinction, a 
metaphysical humanism. 
This History, has a history. And its path has not run smooth. On the contrary, the 
humanist anthropology that underpins it is no longer in good shape. As we pass 
from a largely conceptual issue of the contrast between humanistic and biologistic 
conceptions of human differences, to more speculative historical questions about the 
transition in Europe from one to the other, we will begin to see why. 
Hegel, like every classic thinker of the history of the world is keen to stress that the 
history he is narrating itself has what might be called a rational intelligibility: it is a 
history that has definite stages each preparing the way to a next step from a definite 
origin on the way to a definite end. However, this narrative structure is not held only 
to express a rational movement – the unfolding of reason in (as) history – but, 
equally, demonstrates what Hegel calls the ‘religious truth’ of this teleological 
development; namely, that ‘a Providence controls it’.41  The history of the world, 
                                                        
39 Immanuel Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’, in Hans Reiss (ed.) Kant: 
Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), p. 48. 
40 Jacques Derrida rightly describes Kant’s text on universal history as being, despite the radically 
cosmopolitical intent, ‘the most strongly eurocentered text that can be’ (Derrida, ‘Of the Humanities and the 
Philosophical Discipline. The right to philosophy from the cosmopolitical point of view (the example of an 
international institution)’, Surfaces 4:310, 1994, p. 10. 
41 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 13. 
‘Europe, for example’ 
 
 
 
14 
universal history, is presided over by God, and the ultimate plan of God is nothing 
short of the ‘ultimate design of the world’.42  
So the History of Spirit, the teleology of reason, has always also been a religious 
history, an historical theodicy. European humanism is onto-theology. However, for 
reasons that are not in fact external to this theodicial vision, the historical unfolding 
of this European world has had its political mainstream at an increasingly 
conspicuous distance from traditional Christian institutional powers.43 Moreover, 
and following what Derrida calls ‘the Marxist coup’ or ‘blow’ during the course of the 
twentieth century, and ‘the history of totalitarianism’ that is inseparable from it,44 it is 
increasingly rare to find efforts to frame the trajectory of history in terms of a 
theodicy in which ‘the History of the World is…not only not “without” God, but is 
essentially His Work’. The ‘good news’ announced by Francis Fukuyama certainly 
found a ready audience after the fall of the Berlin Wall,45 but the residual traces of a 
strictly theodicial conception of history went for the most part unremarked.46 
Nevertheless, and all this being said, even if theodicial histories are no longer 
enthusiastically endorsed, the classic Graeco-Christian schemata of Europe as the 
exemplary figure of the ideal form of a “properly civilized” society has definitely not 
gone away. 
There is a temptation to meet any such Eurocentricism with an opposing anti-
Eurocentrism, and so to regard the world-wide-ization of the European world not as 
the (noble) movement of Spirit but as the (imperialism) of a hegemonic Power. 
Indeed, the becoming-world-wide of the European world is often identified with, 
and in many approaches simply reduced to, the hegemonic internationalization of 
neo-liberal techno-capitalism. However, while it would be absurd to deny the 
colonizing capacities of modern technological and capitalist economies, we need to 
                                                        
42 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History,  p. 17. 
43 That the history of the Graeco-Christianisation of the world is also a history of secularisation is central to 
Hegel’s account of world history. See Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 53. I explore this link 
further in Glendinning, ‘Japheth’s World: The Rise of Secularism and the Revival of Religion Today’, The 
European Legacy, 14:4, 2009, pp. 409-426. 
44 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International 
(London: Routledge, 1994), p. 97. 
45 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992), p. xiii. 
46 A notable exception here is Jacques Derrida, who attends carefully to this continuity in the opening 
chapters of Specters of Marx. 
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acknowledge that the “globalization” we are witnessing today is a process that has a 
deep historical intelligibility as well as an economic and political one: namely, as the 
Christianizing or Pagano-Christianizing of the world. And we (and among us, I 
include here both those who still content themselves with reaffirming or celebrating 
a certain European history and those who still content themselves with opposing it) 
are all Christians, all Graeco-Christians. 
 
Europe Beyond Itself 
The classic European discourse of the History of the World was, as we have seen, 
fundamentally a theological history of the origins and ends of Man. In our time, the 
theological account of human origins has been largely displaced in Europe by natural 
histories. And that naturalistic turn does not leave the old idea of the ends of Man in 
good shape either. On behalf of those who inhabit the European world I have been 
describing in this paper, the British philosopher David Wiggins speaking of our time 
as ‘a time after Darwin’ puts it like this: 
Unless we are Marxists, we are more resistant [today] than the 
eighteenth- or nineteenth-centuries knew how to be [to] attempts to 
locate the meaning of human life or human history in mystical or 
metaphysical conceptions – in the emancipation of mankind, or 
progress, or the onward advance of Absolute Spirit. It is not that we 
have lost interest in emancipation or progress themselves. But 
whether temporarily or permanently, we have more or less abandoned 
the idea that the importance of emancipation or progress (or a correct 
conception of spiritual advance) is that these are marks by which our 
minute speck in the universe can distinguish itself as the spiritual 
focus of the cosmos.47 
What we are witnessing here is nothing short of a changeover in the default  
understanding of the world and the signifiance of our lives: a movement of 
                                                        
47 David Wiggins, ‘Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life’, Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 
p. 91. 
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naturalization that intervenes in every discourse on human history and human 
differences of European origin. Indeed, this movement is fundamental to the 
emergence of biologistic racial theory from within the tradition of classic humanism. As 
Heidegger notes, the point of departure for a humanist metaphysics already invites a 
certain naturalistic – and so in principle biologistic – rendering: ‘In principle we are still 
thinking of homo animalis – even when…this is later posited as subject, person or 
spirit’.48 Racial theory in Europe would thus emerge in the effort systematically to forge 
a thoroughly scientific and hence naturalistic anthropology. Human differences, still 
understood on the linear model that belonged to universal history (in which, in fact and 
in principle, all human differences were conceived as contingent, labile and destined for 
eventual elimination), were now conceived as natural and (‘for all intents and 
purposes’) fixed. The old, historically cast, ethnocentrism becomes enshrined in a 
new and fully naturalised anthropology of human differences. 
This is the movement of the world ‘after Darwin’ But our today is a time after 
Auschwitz as well as after Darwin.49 And in this time the idea that European 
responsibility might be compatible with the violent colonization and conquest of 
supposedly “inferior” peoples is no longer remotely credible. In the absence of either 
mystical or metaphysical conceptions of a final end of Man which would ground it, 
classic European humanism struggles to make its way too. Nevertheless, in the wake of 
the wave of the changes that are usually identified with the ‘social modernization’ 
that Jürgen Habermas takes to have gone ‘hand in hand’ with European 
secularization,50 a certain cosmopolitan ideal – in which the idea of the dignity of every 
other is retained in the democratic principle that each one counts one – is still able to 
present a powerful foil to biologistic theories of racial purity and supremacy, theories 
which are now largely (though not exclusively) confined to the most extreme voices of 
                                                        
48 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, p. 227. 
49  As John Gray notes, the first and no doubt most ‘peculiar achievement’ of the movement of naturalisation 
in our understanding of the world that the Enlightenment inaugurated ‘was to give genocide the blessing of 
science and civilization. Mass murder could be justified by faux-Darwinian ideas of survival of the fittest, 
and the destruction of entire peoples could be welcomed as a part of the advance of the species’ (John Gray, 
Black Mass, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007, p. 62). 
50 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, European Journal of Philosophy, 14:1 2006, p. 2. 
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revolutionary nationalism.51 Here again, however, we should see that the resources for 
a political alternative to racist nationalisms also have their origin in the European, that 
is to say onto-theological, philosophical tradition. As Derrida noted in a lecture at the 
University of Sussex in 1997, cosmopolitanism is a political outlook  
which comes to us from, on the one hand, Greek thought with the 
Stoics, who have a concept of the ‘citizen of the world’, and also, on the 
other hand, from St. Paul in the Christian tradition, where we find 
another call for a citizen of the world as, precisely, a brother. St. Paul 
says that we are all brothers, that is, sons of God. So we are not 
foreigners, we belong to the world as citizens of the world.52 
Of course, as I stressed earlier it would be unwise to think one knew where racist ideas 
begin or end or what it means to be free of them, and nothing changes overnight on this 
terrain. Nevertheless, it can now be seen that the classic cosmopolitan desire for a 
universalizable culture of European Civilization, a desire based on a metaphysics of 
human differences that was inherently vulnerable to the worst forms of racial 
naturalisation, also freed the space for a movement of egalitarian, democratic 
cosmopolitan desire, and hence for a new hope: the hope for what one might call a 
‘universalizable culture of singularities’.53 
Some might think that Europe, more than anywhere, ought not to try to advance itself as 
promoting a universalizable culture of anything. However, it is not at all obvious that 
such a link to a proposed example can or should be altogether avoided. For example, it 
has been argued by Louisa Passerini that a new European subjectivity would be 
acceptable only if it were to abandon ‘the illusions of grandeur and hegemonic 
expectations of the old subject’. On this view, Europe should forgo every gesture of 
universalizability and learn to live ‘within its own limits’ and ‘to accept its own 
particularity’, ‘for example’ as ‘a cultural region’ among others.54 Fine, but even this 
                                                        
51 The movement of naturalisation can also be turned against racial theories and raciology, and it is clear 
that modern genetics, for all its reductive ambitions, has no place for ‘race’ in its theories at all. 
52 The text of the lecture can be found at http://www.livingphilosophy.org/Derrida-politics-friendship.htm 
53 This phrase appears in the expression of a hope still worth having in Jacques Derrida, ‘Faith and 
Knowledge’, in J. Derrida and G. Vattimo (eds.), Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 7. I discuss the 
transition from classic to democratic cosmopolitanism in more detail in Glendinning, ‘Japheth’s World’, pp. 
418-422. 
54 Passerini, Memory and Utopia, p. 107. 
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attempt to get Europe to draw in its horns clearly fails to escape the universalist logic of 
the example. Not only would such horn-drawing be regard as universally fitting – there 
is absolutely no call here for some other ‘cultural region’ to take up the position of ‘the 
old subject’ of Europe and to cultivate hegemonic expectations in Europe’s stead – but 
the very question of what a ‘cultural region’ is seems clearly inseparable from the 
European example. Europe as a cultural region among others? Oh yes! A cultural region 
– no doubt about it!  Very cultural in fact (think of all those works of European 
literature, its art and music, its, theatre, architecture, cuisine, sport, and so on). Europe, 
a cultural region? Yes, yes! Par excellence, yes! Indeed, isn’t the opposition between 
nature and culture itself one of the basic schemas of the European worldview? And, in 
any case, don’t we now say ‘culture’ where not so long ago we said…‘spirit’? 
As Gasché puts it, those who are happy simply to denounce as ‘Eurocentric’ certain 
‘ideas (such as universality, apodicticity, self-responsibility, and so forth)’,55 those who 
understand Europe primarily as a geographical and political entity or cultural region 
and who would set themselves in ‘opposition’ to investigations of Europe as something 
like a philosopheme, are ‘defeated’ by the fact that this idea ‘is shaped not only by the 
fundamental demand to transcend whatever is particular but also that which still tinges 
this idea itself with particularity’56. The thought of Europe as a regional culture, for 
example, is still the thought of a European example. One advances towards the other 
when one undertakes to close upon oneself in an exemplary way. 
The main argument of this paper is pitted against an anti-Eurocentrist doxa that 
associates Europe with a ‘moribund’ – because profoundly racist – worldview. 
However, understanding Europe as an exemplary philosopheme invites us not only 
think of “Europe” from the point of view of philosophy, but reciprocally to shed light 
on the very ambition to ‘know one’s way about’ that, as a response to estranged 
empuzzlement with something familiar, inaugurates philosophy. And perhaps what 
Europe has to teach us here, above all, is that the implicit telos of such an ambition – the 
aim of finally achieving complete clarity – is, from the start, slated to disappointment. 
                                                        
55 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 8. 
56 Gasché, Europe, Or the Infinite Task, p. 8. 
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Rounding out the Levinasian formula, and doing so by precisely refusing a final turn of 
the delimiting screw, Derrida puts the point as follows: 
One should more prudently say “Greek, Christian and beyond”, to 
designate those places towards which we are still timorously 
advancing: Judaism and Islam, [to be included] at the very least… 
However, above all, and starting from and still in Nietzsche’s wake, [to 
designate] the entire passage beyond whose movement bears his 
name. That is to say, everywhere where a tradition thus tends of itself 
to break with itself.57 
This Nietzschean ‘passage beyond’ is inside Europe’s identity: it does not indicate a 
break from it, nor does it suggest that what has been adduced so far as inside this 
identity (the Greek, the Christian) is a merely preliminary gesture that needs an “and 
so on” tagged onto the end of an otherwise only partially completed list, to be 
completed later when all the facts are in (though quite rightly Derrida prefers a more 
judicious acknowledgement of influences). Rather, it indicates a kind of fundamental 
or irreducible readiness for taking a risk with itself, an openness for the change in 
heading, for the dis-placement of itself beyond itself – but remaining faithful to itself 
in that movement. For this reason, the ‘passage beyond’ is never a movement that 
simply rejects the European heritage or that wants simply to destroy it and move on 
to something completely different, but a movement which, in the name of Europe, 
for example in the name of “we good Europeans”, aims to propel it in a new 
direction out of (i.e. both ‘from’ and ‘beyond’) its own sources: not to destroy the 
heritage but to give it a future. 
This, finally, may be what lodges a dimension of not-knowing into every 
understanding of ‘the idea of Europe’; it is what, makes Europe a philosopheme. On 
this construal, the apparent “lack” of a “completely thematisable identity” is not a 
shortcoming to be “overcome” by a more rigorous or powerful analysis.58 On the 
contrary, it helps us see that with this philosopheme a certain beyond of a 
                                                        
57 Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship (London: Verso, 1997), p. 103. 
58 It is in this vein that Stanley Cavell seeks from philosophy ‘an acknowledgement of human limitation 
which does not leave us chafed by our own skins’ (Stanley Cavell, ‘The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later 
Philosophy’, Must We Mean What We Say, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 61.) He does not 
get caught up in issues concerning, for example, the colour of this skin, however. 
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thematisable understanding of Europe’s identity – though that task should in no way 
be foregone – is also what we need to save: that ‘beyond’ belongs inside its present 
identity. 
Just in this case? Perhaps the example of Europe is not just one example among 
others. Geoffrey Bennington’s reflection on the example with which we began, the 
example of our understanding of time, seems to invite and welcome countless 
substitutions. But the example of Europe seems especially fitting. Here, exemplarily, 
the sort of not-knowing that we saw Gasché affirming against postcolonial certainties 
far from being reducible through further research or investigation   
should perhaps be read less as a preliminary gesture, recognising a 
difficulty that philosophy will then confront and resolve (so that the 
natural telos of any philosophical explanation of time [for example, or 
of Europe, for example] is to overcome that not-knowing and replace it 
with clear and explicit knowledge), and more as a positive or 
affirmative claim: perhaps time [for example, or Europe, for example] 
is such that my knowledge of it can only ever be of the order of non-
knowledge, or a ‘knowledge’ that fades or disappears when questioned 
or called upon to present itself in the form of a theory or a thesis.59  
The point here is not simply that future experiences or discoveries might lead us to 
revise any theory or thesis we have hitherto come up with. Rather (and to paraphrase 
Bennington once more), even the very best, most attentive, rigorous and painstaking 
thought of Europe, will not, even in principle, lead us to a ‘triumphant conceptual 
clarity’ regarding it, but will rather ‘produce a complexity in thought that, beyond 
what understanding we can (and should) nevertheless aspire to, calls for something’.60 
Calls for…what?61 Nothing one says here will be immune to the very limitation it is 
trying to come to terms with. However, what seems central is that finding oneself 
(necessarily) unequal to the task of achieving a yearned for, once for all, complete 
conceptual clarity (knowing what Europe is, for example) tends only to accentuate 
                                                        
59 Geoffrey Bennington, ‘Reading Time’, Other Analyses, (e-book, 2005), pp. 6-7. 
60 Bennington, ‘Reading Time’, p. 5. (Emphasis mine). 
61 Bennington suggests that what it calls for is ‘something of the order of enactment or confession or 
witnessing’ (Bennington, ‘Reading Time’, p. 5). This is a somewhat disparate order and I have attempted to 
boil it down somewhat in the main text.  
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rather than diminish a sense of one’s responsibility, now, to respond to that task.62 
‘What are you going to do TODAY?’, Paul Valéry pointedly asks at the outset of his 
“Notes on the Greatness and Decline of Europe”.63 Taking up the challenge some 
fifty years later, Jacques Derrida wagers that ‘we today’ want ‘a completely new 
“today” of Europe’;64 a today in which one no longer finds it remotely adequate to 
respond to Europe today by indulging in either Eurocentric back-slapping and self-
congratulation or anti-Eurocentric avowals of guilt and self-accusation.65 Beyond these 
‘exhausted programs’, Derrida finds, nevertheless, that the traditional conceptuality 
of ‘all European discourse about Europe’66 – that is to say, the humanist discourse of 
Man and the end of Man that has been the theme and thesis of this paper and which 
supplies the very ‘language of our language’,67 as Derrida puts it, for thinking 
Europe today – does more than offer an unforgettable resource for our own thinking, 
but ‘right along with’ that inherited conceptual resource, right inside that heritage, an 
irrecusable responsibility ‘imposes itself on us’; a responsibility to ‘make ourselves 
the guardians of an idea of Europe’.68 Not, he emphasises, the guardians of a specific 
regional culture, one distinctive human community among others, ‘but of a 
difference of Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself off in its own identity 
and in advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not’.69 To be this new 
advancing guardian, this new avant guard for an idea of Europe, is never an 
exclusively or exhaustively theoretical or ideational affair. It means ‘to take risks, to 
stick one’s neck out’.70 It means ‘taking the lead in taking an initiative and sometimes 
even to go on the offensive’.71 It means getting caught up with Europe, for example. 
 
 
                                                        
62 This is the logic at work, I think, in the transition Wittgenstein makes in (the notoriously obscure) remark 
in the Investigations from the impossibility of bringing philosophy peace to nevertheless ‘now’ 
demonstrating a method (§133). 
63 Paul Valéry, History and Politics, New York: Bollingen, 1962, p. 228. 
64 Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading, Indiana University Press, 1992, p. 12. 
65 ‘Am I taking advantage of the “we” when I begin saying that…we today no longer want either 
Eurocentrsim or anti-Eurocentrism’ (Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 13. See also p. 26. 
66 Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 27. 
67 Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 28. 
68 Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 29. 
69 Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 29 (emphasis in original). 
70 Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 49.  
71 Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 49. 
‘Europe, for example’ 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Recent LEQS papers 
Winkler, Heinrich August. ‘Greatness and Limits of the West. The History of an Unfinished Project.’ 
LEQS Paper No. 30, February 2011 
Dani, Marco. 'Assembling the fractured European consumer.' LEQS Paper No. 29, January 2011 
Joerges, Christian. 'Unity in Diversity as Europe's Vocation and Conflict's Law as Europe's 
Constitutional Form.' LEQS Paper No. 28, December 2010 
Kylstad, Ingrid. 'Turkey and the EU: A 'new' European identity in the making?' LEQS Paper No. 27, 
November 2010 
Costa-i-Font, Joan. 'Regional Single Currency Effects on Bilateral Trade with the European Union.' 
LEQS Paper No. 26, October 2010  
Erkan, Ozgur. ‘Spain’s Referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty: A Quantitative Analysis 
Within the Conceptual Framework of First and Second Order Elections.’ LEQS Paper No. 25, June 
2010 
White, Jonathan. ‘Left, Right and Beyond: The Pragmatics of Political Mapping.’ LEQS Paper No. 24, 
June 2010 
Monastiriotis, Vassilis & Zartaloudis, Sotirios. 'Beyond the crisis: EMU and labour market 
reform pressures in good and bad times.' LEQS Paper No. 23, June 2010 
Lütz, Susanne & Kranke, Matthias. ‘The European Rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF 
Lending to Central and Eastern European Countries.’ LEQS Paper No. 22, May 2010 
Hartlapp, Miriam; Metz, Julia & Rauh, Christian. 'The agenda set by the EU Commission: the result of 
balanced or biased aggregation of positions?' LEQS Paper No. 21, April 2010 
Costa-i-Font, Joan. 'Unveiling Vertical State Downscaling: Identity and/or the Economy?' LEQS Paper 
No. 20, March 2010 
Delanty, Gerard. 'The European Heritage from a Critical Cosmopolitan Perspective. LEQS Paper No. 19, 
February 2010 
Outhwaite, William. 'Europe at 21: Transitions and Transformations since 1989'. LEQS Paper No. 18, 
January 2010 
Lavdas, Kostas A..'Normative Evolution in Europe: Small States and Republican Peace'. LEQS Paper 
No. 17, January 2010 
Schelkle, Waltraud. ‘Good governance in crisis or a good crisis for governance? A comparison of the EU 
and the US’. LEQS Paper No. 16, December 2009 
Keating, Michael. ‘Second Round Reform. Devolution and constitutional reform in the United 
Kingdom, Spain and Italy’. LEQS Paper No. 15, December 2009 
Hyman, Richard. ‘Trade Unions and ‘Europe’: Are the Members out of Step?’. LEQS Paper No. 14, 
November 2009  
Dani, Marco. ‘Economic and social conflicts, integration and constitutionalism in contemporary 
Europe’. LEQS Paper No. 13, November 2009 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEQS 
European Institute 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
WC2A 2AE London 
Email: euroinst.LEQS@lse.ac.uk  
 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/Home.aspx   
